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JUDICIAL COMMENTS ON PENDING 
CASES: THE ETHICAL RESTRICTIONS 
AND THE SANCTIONS-A CASE 
STUDY OF THE MICROSOFT 
LITIGATION 
Ronald D. Rotunda* 
In our legal system, the most authoritative figures are the judges. 
Yet, despite the increased demands and offers for media commentary 
that judges must be receiving, in the following article, Professor 
Ronald Rotunda explains that judges are ethically prohibited from 
providing ex parte commentary about ongoing cases. He argues that 
the prohibition is and should be absolute-whether dealing with print 
or electronic media. This is especially true if the judge is presiding 
over the case. Professor Rotunda draws his primary examples from 
the recent media coverage surrounding the Microsofi antitrust trial; 
but he contends that the rules apply across the board. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As a matter of routine, judges typically instruct jurors not to discuss 
the case with each other until the end of the trial. As a matter of fair-
ness, we do not want jurors to start deliberating with themselves as to 
what the verdict should be until both sides have had the opportunity to 
present all of their evidence. In addition, if a juror (let us call him Juror 
Loquacious) starts explaining to (and trying to persuade) a fellow juror 
why he thinks one side should win, his explanations may start to appear 
like arguments and later, Juror Loquacious may be reluctant to back off, 
admit that he had been in error, and that he should change his mind 
when faced with other evidence. 
When the jurors have rendered their verdict, judges typically thank 
them for their services and then may instruct them that they are not obli-
gated to disclose to the curious what they said in the jury room. What 
Bismarck is supposed to have said about laws (like sausage, it is best not 
* Albert E . .Tenner, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law; Visiting Senior 
Fellow in Constitutional Studies, The Cato Institute. 
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to see how they were made) may also apply to jury deliberations. Jurors 
may talk if they want to, but sometimes it may be best not to know ex-
actly how the sausage has been made. 
These principles apply to judges too, particularly in bench trials. As 
a matter of fairness, we do not allow judges to comment publicly about 
pending cases outside the courtroom and to announce their views prior 
to the close of the evidence. If Judge Loquacious (our counterpart to Ju. 
ror Loquacious) talks to reporters about a case pending personally be-
fore him, he may also talk himself into a mind set. Like Juror L~qua­
cious, he may well be reluctant to admit that he had misjudged some 
testimony, or that he had been in error in asking the parties to explore a 
particular issue, or that his initial instincts were fatally wrong. 
In addition, judges are normally fiercely protective of their delibera-
tive process. Like Bismarck, judges ordinarily do not want us to see the 
sausage being made. But the purpose of the rule forbidding judges from 
engaging in conversations about pending cases outside the presence of 
the counsel for both parties is not simply to protect judges from broad-
casting their deliberative processes. Judges do not have the right to 
"waive" the proscription because the purpose of the prohibition against 
ex parte communications is not to protect the judge; it is to protect the 
parties and the system of justice. 
If the judge discussed his deliberative processes, or his thought-
process, or his evaluation of the evidence with a reporter, those state-
ments are part of the published newspaper interview, but are not part of 
the record. Should a party be able, on appeal, to argue that the judge's 
factual assumption was wrong, or the party should have a right to have 
the case remanded so that it can counter the judge's evaluation of the 
evidence, as reported in the newspaper interview? If so, should the other 
party be able to show (by cross-examining the judge or the reporter) that 
the judge never really relied on that thought-process or evaluation to the 
extent or in the way that the reporter believed? Or, should the appellate 
court determine that it should ignore what the judge said, even though 
the trial judge apparently told several reporters the same story? 
Judge Loquacious's ex parte communications during the trial are 
more troubling than Juror Loquacious's ex parte communications for 
another reason. Juror Loquacious will be talking to other jurors. But 
Judge Loquacious will be communicating with reporters, and these re-
porters, unlike the jurors, will have been exposed to information that is 
outside the record. The problem is not simply that the judge is talking to 
reporters; it is that reporters are talking to the judge. If Judge Loqua-
cious engages in conversations with reporters about the pending case, the 
very nature of a "conversation" is that there is give and take. The judge 
will not only be communicating information to the reporters, they will be 
communicating information to him. A conversation is a dialogue, a spo-
ken exchange. 
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The reporters will, at the very least, be asking questions and those 
questions may include information that is not part of the record. For ex-
ample, a reporter might say, "Judge Loquacious, did you know that Ex-
pert Witness Number 1 acted very nervous in the hallway after his cross-
examination?" Or, "I overheard a lawyer for the defendant admit that 
she is unhappy with the way that they are presenting the testimony of 
their witness yesterday aiternoon. Are you surprised?" No party can re-
spond to, and refute, the information that a reporter may have given the 
judge, because the lawyers were not present. Those conversations, after 
all, are ex parte and not on the record. We will never know-after the 
trial-exactly what was said months earlier when the judge engaged in ex 
parte communications with reporters whom the judge favored by grant-
ing interviews. 
These reporters may also relay to the lawyers for one party or the 
other some of the information gleaned from the judge, thus granting that 
party an advantage in the litigation. The reporter's communications with 
the lawyers for one of the parties is also off the record, so we will never 
really know precisely what was said. The reporter's remarks may be in-
advertent, and the lawyers with whom they discuss the case may not even 
be aware of the origins of the reporter's insights about the trial judge. 
But the other lawyers will still have been disadvantaged. 
Canon 3B(9) of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct reflects 
these concerns. It offers an important admonition regarding a judge's 
public comments about cases: 
A judge shall not, while a proceeding is pending or impending in 
any court, make any public comment that might reasonably be ex-
pected to affect its outcome or impair its fairness or make any non-
public comment that might substantially interfere with a fair trial or 
hearing. The judge shall require similar abstention on the part of 
court personnel subject to the judge's direction and control. This 
Section does not prohibit judges from making public statements in 
the course of their official duties or from explaining for public in-
formation the procedures of the court. This Section does not apply 
to proceedings in which the judge is a litigant in a personal capac-
ityl 
1. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon3B(9) (1990). 
This section replaces Canon 3A(6) of the 1972 version of the ABA Model Judicial Code. That sec-
tion read: 
(6) A judge should ab~tain from public comment about a pending or impending proceeding in any 
court, and should require similar abstention on the part of court personnel subject to his direction 
and control. This subsection does not prohibit judges from making public statements in the 
course of their official duties or from explaining for public information the procedures of the 
court 
!d. Canon 3A(6) (1972). The Commentary to this section read: 
"Court personnel" does not include the lawyers in a proceeding before a judge. The conduct of 
lawyers is governed by D.R. 7-107 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and by Rule 
3.6 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 
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II. THE CONTOURS OF THE PUBLIC COMMENT RESTRICTIONS OF ABA 
CANON3B 
A. Judge as Private Litigant 
Note how precisely the drafters crafted the no public comment re-
strictions of Canon 3B. The breadth of the prohibition is reflected and 
emphasized in the Canon's carefully articulated and charily granted ex-
ceptions. A prime exception is the case of a judge who is suing or being 
sued in a personal capacity. That person has the same rights of any other 
litigant in a proceeding to comment outside the courtroom. Yet even 
then this rule makes clear that if the judge is party to litigation in her of-
ficial capacity, such as in a mandamus action (where the judge is techni-
cally a litigant), "the judge must not comment publicly."' 
B. Time Period 
The rule also demarcates the time period for this restriction. The 
no comment rule comes into play even before a party files a complaint; 
the prohibition begins when the case is about to be brought or its filing is 
imminent (it is "impending"). And it continues as long as the case is not 
final (it is "pending"). 
A proceeding is not final if the time for appeal has not yet passed. 
Thus, the official ABA Comment to this section explains that the "re-
quirement that judges abstain from public comment regarding a pending 
or impending proceeding continues during any appellate process and un-
til final disposition. "3 
C. The Court in Which the Case h Pending 
The language of the no public comment rule uses the phrase, "any 
court." Perhaps one might argue that "any court" only refers to any 
court in the judge's jurisdiction. However, the policies behind this no 
!d. cmL These provisions of the.1972 Judicial Code were not amended between 1972 and 1990, when 
the ABA replaced the old model code with the new one. The main difference is that the word 
·'should" is replaced with "shall." The 1972 Rules consistently used "should," but they really meant 
"shall.'" 
2. ld. Canon 3B(9), cmt. (1990). The Comment makes this point quite clearly. Thus, if the 
judge is suing because someone crashed into her car, she is a litigant in a personal capacity. If a party 
is suing the judge in order to comply with the rules of mandamus, the judge is not being sued in a per~ 
sonal capacity and the broad "no comment" rules apply: "This section does not prohibit a judge from 
commenting on proceedings in which the judge is a litigant in a personal capacity, but in cases such as 
a writ of mandamus where the judge is a litigant in an official capacity, the judge must not comment 
publicly." !d. (emphasis added). 
3. /d. 
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comment rule are so strong that it is easy to find case law that interprets 
"any court" to mean "any court. "4 
At some point, there may be free speech concerns in reading this 
language too broadly5 But, after reviewing the case law, a judge who 
does not wish to push the envelope and risk sanction or litigation should 
not make public comments about cases pending in courts outside of her 
jurisdiction. Consider, for example, the incident where a municipal court 
judge in New Jersey appeared as an uncompensated guest commentator 
on Court TV and CNBC to discuss the O.J. Simpson murder trial, which 
was pending in California.6 The state supreme court, in the case of In re 
Broadbelt,1 ruled that this conduct violated Canon 3B(9), i.e., it consti-
tuted commentary on a pending case, albeit one that could never have 
come before that judge. The court argued that it should read the ethics 
prohibition so broadly because the judge's comments could have had 
special weight in view of his position as a judge and "had the potential to 
compromise the integrity of the judiciary in New Jersey."8 
Similarly, a New York judicial ethics opinion interpreted "any 
court" to include any court. It reasoned that a judge's comments and ob-
servations about a pending case "could prove troublesome" because of 
the "immediacy" of the ongoing litigation. "These comments and obser-
vations are being made solely in the context of and with special reference 
4. See In re BroadbeH, 683 A.2d 543,546 (N.J. 1996); In re Hey, 425 S.E.2d 221, 222 .... -24 (W.Va. 
1992) (Hey 1). Both cases concluded thal the phrase "any court" includes courts other than comment-
ing judge's court. 
See also DAVID M. ROTI-IM/I.N, CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL CONDUCT HANDBOOK 1-39 (J 990) (arguing 
that judicial comments on cases pending in courts of other jurisdictions could affect outcome, could 
appear to exert pressure on the judge to decide a certain way, and could undermine public confidence 
in judicial decisions); RONALD D. ROTUNDA, LEGALETHlCS: THE LAWYER'S DESKBOOK ON PROFES· 
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY§ 60-L4 (1st ed. 2000); William G. Ross, Extrajudicial Speech: Charting the 
Boundaries of Propriety, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 589, 598 (1989). 
5. Cf LlSA L. MILORD. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA JUDJCJAL CODE 21-22 (1992). Mi~ 
lord points out that the revised ABA Judicial Code does not intend to prevent judges "in their extra-
judicial teaching and writing" to "refer to pending or impending cases in other jurisdictions" when do-
ing so does not diminish "the fairness of those cases or the appearance of judicial impartiality." !d. at 
21. The way the revised Judicial Code takes care of this issue is by adding the language, "that might 
reasonably be expected to affect its outcome or impair its fairness or make any nonpublic comment 
that might substantially interfere with a fair trial or hearing." MODEL CoDE OF JUDICIAL COKDUCT 
Canon 3B(9) (1990). Note that, as discussed below, the CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES 
JUDGES Canon 3A(6) does not adopt the same limiting language-"might reasonably be expected to 
affect its outcome." See infra note 19 and accompanying text. 
6. See Ronald D. Rotunda, Reporting Sensational Trials: Free Press, a Responsible Press, and 
Cameras in the Courts, 3 COMM. L. & PoL'Y 295 (1998) (discussing the O.J. Simpson murder trial and 
its press coverage). 
7. 683 A.2d 543 (N.J. 1996). This case described Judge Broadbelt as a well-respected municipal 
judge, who appeared as a guest commentator on Court TV in excess of fifty times since 1992. "Since 
November 1994, [he] appeared on CNBC on three occasions to provide guest commentary on the O.J. 
Simpson case. He also appeared on a local television program in 1994 to discuss generally the jurisdic-
tion and procedures of the municipal courts. Judge Broadbelt did not receive compensation for any of 
those television appearances." /d. at 544-45. 
8. !d. at 548. In addition, the court maintained that the judge's conduct violated Canon 2B be-
cause his regular appearances caused him to become identified with the programs and used the pres-
tige of his judicial office to further the interests of the television producers. See id. at 550. 
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to an ongoing litigation," which had been telecast that day, Laypeople 
might see the judge's remarks "as lending a judicial imprimatur to legal 
positions being advanced by one of the parties in an existing legal action, 
which legal positions may not have yet been ultimately determined. Snch 
remarks would constitute public comment about a pending matter and, 
therefore, are not permitted."9 
Given these cases, it should be clear that a judge should not engage 
in extrajudicial comments about cases that are pending before the judge 
or before court where the judge sits. 
D. Public Comments as Part of Official Duties and to ~xplain the 
Procedures of the Court 
The restriction on public comments is written in such an absolute 
fashion that the drafters of the rule decided that they must specifically 
allow judges to make "public statements in the course of their official du-
ties," and to explain "for public information the procedures of the 
court."10 For example, the judge may say to the press, "the defendant has 
30 days to file a notice of appeal." The judge may also repeat to the me-
dia what she has already said in open courtn 
The purpose of the "official duties" is not to give a judge carte 
blanche authority to say whatever he or she wants. As the Alabama Su-
preme Court concluded, a "judge is strictly prohibited from public com-
ment on the merits of a pending case. On the other hand, a judge is en-
couraged to explain a pending case in abstract terms. Obviously, judges 
walk a fine line between the duties and prohibitions of [this canon]."12 In 
that case, the Alabama Court suspended the judge for two months with-
out pay for, among other things, making some comments to a reporter 
(who had called him in the evening before a hearing) about the merits of 
a case over which this judge was presidingY 
In the New Jersey case discussed above, where the state judge 
commented on television about the O.J. Simpson murder trial in Califor-
nia, the fact that the judge's appearances were educational did not excuse 
the violations.14 This education exception only authorizes the judge to 
9. N.Y. Advisory Cmnm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 93-133 (1994). 
10. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3B(9) (1990). 
11. See United States v. Yonkers Bd. ofEduc., 946 F.2d 180, 184-85 (2d Cir. 1991). 
12. In re Sheffield, 465 So. 2d 350,355 (Ala. 1984) (emphasis added). 
l3. See id. at 354~55. The court held that: (1) clear and convincing evidence did not establish 
that the judge acted in bad faith in issuing a show cause order or in erroneously finding an individual 
guilty of contempt of court, but, (2) the judge's failure to abstain from public comment about a pend-
ing proceeding and his failure to disqualify himself where impartiality might be questioned warranted 
two months' suspension without pay. See id. at 359. 
14. In re Broadbelt, 683 A.2d 543,547 (N.J. 1996). 
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explain legal terms and procedures; it does not authorize judges to com-
ment on the merits of a pending case.15 
More recently, the Arkansas Supreme Court ordered the clerk of 
the court to forward a copy of its opinion to the Arkansas Judicial Disci-
pline and Disability Commission to investigate a state judge who made 
statements to news outlets defending his conduct in a case involving the 
rape prosecution of a former Boy Scout leader. The judge, in an effort to 
defend himself, made extrajudicial statements to several television sta-
tions and the victims.16 The proper way for the judge to explain his rul-
ings and to educate the public and news media is to write an opinion, not 
to give press conferences or engage in extrajudicial comments. 
IlL THE FEDERAL RULES 
A. The Code of Conduct for United States Judges 
Many people are unaware that, like most state judiciaries, the U.S. 
Judicial Conference has adopted its own Code of Conduct for United 
States Judges17 to govern the ethical conduct of federal judges18 This 
Code, just like most state judicial codes, is derived from the ABA Model 
Code of Judicial Conduct. With respect to the no public comment provi-
sion, the federal rule roughly parallels the ABA model rule, although its 
prohibition is even stricter19 
Canon 3A(6), of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges, 
states: 
15. "While judges may not comment on the merits of a pending case, a judge may and should ex-
plain legal terms, and concepts, procedures, and the issues involved in the case so as !o permit the news 
representatives to cover the case more intelligently. Often there is no one, other than the judge, 
who is in a position to give a detaikd and impartial explanation of the case to the news media." In re 
Sheffield, 465 So. 2d at 355 (emphasis added) (quoting from the NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE 
TRIAL JUDGES COMMITTEE ON NEWS REPORTING AND FAIR TRIAL, JUDICIAL GUIDELINES FOR 
DEALING WITH NEWS MEDIA INQUIRIES AND CRITICISM (5th Draft, 1984)). 
16. See Walls v. State, 20 S.W.3d 322, 325 (2000). The trial judge spoke to the media concerning 
appellant's case and reportedly met with appellant's victims apart from appellant's counsel. After re~ 
mand of the sentence, the judge again spoke to the media concerning the cnse. Then he denied appel~ 
!ant's motions to recuse, to withdraw his pleas, and to have a hearing in which appellant showed evi-
dence of the judge's media comments. The court, however, refused to overturn the sentence, which 
was within the statutory limits, because the trial judge's extrajudicial comments reflected disagreement 
with the appellate court, not bias by the particular judge. The court, however, did refer the malter to 
disciplinary authorities. 
17. The latest version of this Code is reprinted in 175 F.R.D. 364 (1998). 
18. These federal judicial ethics rules apply to all federal judges other than those on the Supreme 
Court. See 175 F.R.D. 363 (1998). "This Code applies to United States Circuit Judges, District Judges. 
Court of International Trade Judges, Court of Federal Claims Judges, Bankruptcy Judges, and Magis~ 
trate Judges." !d. 
19. The ABA language requires that the extrajudicial statement "might reasonably be expected 
to affect its outcome or impair its fairness or make any nonpublic comment lhat might substantially 
interfere with a fair lrial or hearing." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3B(9) (2000). 
However, the CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 6A(6) does nor adopt that lim-
iting language-"might reasonably be expected to affect its outcome." See 175 F.R.D. at 367; Mr. 
LORD, supra note 5, at 21-22. 
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A judge should avoid public comment on the merits of a pending or 
impending action, requiring similar restraint by court personnel 
subject to the judge's direction and control. This proscription does 
not extend to public statements made in the course of the judge's 
official duties, to the explanation of court procedures, or to a schol-
arly presentation made for purposes of legal education.20 
Recently, commentators have turned to this federal prohibition on 
extrajudicial comments in light of publicity and criticism21 surrounding 
interviews that Judge Jackson has given the press in connection with his 
bench trial of the United States' civil antitrust prosecution of Microsoft 
Corporation.22 
One of Microsoft's issues on appeal is based on these extrajudicial 
statements to the press. The issue is, "whether the district court's extra-
judicial communications with members of the press require that the 
judgment below be reversed and, if the cases are remanded, that they be 
assigned to another district judge."23 The Justice Department, in re-
sponse, has not defended the propriety of the judge's extrajudicial com-
ments; rather it has argued only that they do not justify reversal.24 
Let us take this example as a case study. I do not mean to focus on 
a particular judge but rather on particular questions-when are extraju-
dicial comments improper, and what should be the appellate remedy if a 
judge has engaged in improper extrajudicial comments in high profile tri-
als. 
In the Microsoft case, for example, the district court responded to 
the criticism by arguing, first, that these extrajudicial remarks and inter-
views to the press were "off the record" and, by agreement with the 
newspapers, would not be disclosed until after he had decided the case.25 
20. 175 F.R.D. at 367. 
21. E.g., Paul Davidson. Judge Might Inspire Appeal: Microsoft May Use Jackson's Words 
Against Him, USA TODAY, June 13, 2000, at 1B ("Jackson's interviews violate judicial canons that say 
judges should avoid comments on a pending case, says Steven Lubet of Northwestern University Law 
School."); James V. Grimaldi, Hearsay; From the Bar: A Resounding 'Shhh/', WASI-l. POST, June 12, 
2000, at F31 (quoting, e.g., Professor Steven Gillers of New York University Law School, a noted legal 
ethics expert, who said: "I was dumbfounded ... I think it is a lapse of judgment. A judge is not sup-
posed to speak publicly about matters pending in any court, especially his own."); Leonard Orland. 
Jackson's Unethical Press Talks, NAT'L L.L Aug. 14, 2000, at A17. Professor Orland teaches at the 
University of Connecticut Law School. 
22. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000), cert. denied and re-
manded, Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 25 (Sept. 26, 2000). Justice Breyer filed the only 
dissent. Chief Justice Rehnquist issued a separate statement on his decision not to disqualify himself 
because his son is a lawyer in a fm11 that Microsoft has hired in another case. 
23. See Brief of Microsoft, Jurisdictional Statement to U.S. Supreme Court, Microsoft Corp. v. 
United States, 121 S. Ct. 25 (2000) (No. 00-139), available at http://www.microsoft.comJpresspass/trial/ 
appeals/07-26jurisdictional.asp (last visited Mar. 26, 2001). 
24. Brief for the United States in Response to the Jurisdictional Statement at 20 n.l8, Microsoft 
Corp. v. United States, 121 S. a. 25 (2000) (No. 00-1.39), available ar http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/publid 
appellate/appclla!e.h!m (last visited Mar. 26, 2001 ). 
25. The Microsoft trial judge said that he spoke to the journalists "on an embargoed basis." In 
other words, the reporters agreed not to publish their stories until he issued his opinion. He said: 
"Until the embargo is lifted, what was said to the journalists was simply never said." Drew Clark, An-
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Second, the district court has defended these remarks by arguing that the 
judge needed to talk to reporters to "correct some of the public distor-
tions" of the facts by "one or both of the parties."26 
Do these arguments justify the extrajudicial comments? And if they 
do not, what should be an appropriate remedy in such cases? 
B. The Extrajudicial Comments in the Microsoft Matter 
Judge Jackson, the Microsofi trial judge, discussed the Microsoft 
case extensively with newspaper reporters when the case was before him, 
sub judice, awaiting his decision, and also after he published his opinion 
breaking up Microsoft on June 7, 2000. In these circumstances, the case 
was pending before him. Even after he issued his main opinion ordering 
the break-up of the company, he had to decide post-trial motions pre-
sented after this opinion and before the parties filed the appeal. Once 
the parties filed their appeals, the case was still pending, in the appellate 
court, either the D.C. Circuit or the U.S. Supreme Court. As this article 
goes to press, the case is still pending. 
The most dramatic of these interviews occurred during trial, when 
the Microsoft judge granted a series of interviews to the New York 
Times. The extrajudicial comments included the following: 
1. THE NEW YORK TIMES, Retracing the Missteps of the Microsoft 
Defense, June 9, 2000. This article explained that Judge Thomas Penfield 
Jackson, the trial judge, "agreed to be interviewed several times after tes-
timony in the trial had ended, with the understanding that his comments 
conld not be published until the case had left his courtroom. The discus-
sions, beginning last September [1999], were friendly, informal and un-
structured." The article quoted extensively from these interviews. When 
the reporter asked the judge about restructnring Microsoft, he "said in 
February [2000], in a rare audience with a sitting Judge during the course 
of a trial, 'I am not sure I am competent to do that. ... I just don't think 
that is something I want to try to do on my own. I wouldn't know how to 
do it."' The judge said that he was incompetent to restructure Microsoft; 
later, that was the very remedy he imposed. The article also reported 
that "in another interview late last month [May, 2000], he sounded very 
different. He said Microsoft's recent behavior had helped change his 
mind." The article also recounted that the judge-on the final day of 
trial-rejected Microsoft's bid for a hearing on the government's remedy 
proposal: "In the interview the next day, Judge Jackson observed: 'I am 
titrust: Judge Jackson Defend~ Microsoft Breakup Order, NAT'LJ. TECH. DAILY, Oct. 27,2000. Of 
course, after he released his opinion, there were still posHrial motions and the appeal. The case was 
still pending. 
26. Microsoft fudge Says He May Step Down from Case on Appeal, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2000, at 
B4 (quotations from Judge Jackson in comments to a law school symposium on the Microsoft trial, 
where the Judge was one of the speakers). 
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not aware of any case authority that says I have to give them any due 
process at all. The case is over. They lost.""' 
2. THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, For Antitrust Judge, Trust, or 
Lack of It, Really Was the [~sue, in an Interview, Jackson Says Microsoft 
Did the Damage to Its Credibility in Court, June 8, 2000. The article is 
based on what it called "an extraordinary interview for a sitting federal 
judge." The interview took place in the Microso.fi judge's chambers on 
June 7, and he explained how, in his view, Microsoft's credibility prob-
lems in the courtroom compromised its defense. The article extensively 
quoted the judge's comments about the case. It reported the judge as 
saying, among other things, "if someone [referring to Microsoft] lies to 
you once, how much else can you credit as the truth?" And, "Things did 
not start well for them." Referring to his refusal to allow Microsoft time 
to argue against the breakup, he compared Microsoft to the Empire of 
Japan after its defeat in World War II: "are you aware of very many 
cases in which the defendant can argue with the jury about what an ap-
propriate sanction should be? Were the Japanese allowed to propose the 
terms of their surrender? The government won the case." The judge 
understood the case was stili pending (although he had issued his opin-
ion), for he acknowledged that legal wrangling on appeal could go on for 
years as it had in the IBM antitrust case, and that "the jury is still out on 
this case. "28 
3. THEW ALL STREET JOURNAL, Judge Orders Microsoft Broken in 
Two, Imposes Tough Restrictions on Practice, June 8, 2000. The article 
reports that the Microsoft judge said "in an interview" why he favored 
immediate Supreme Court review of the case. He is quoted as saying, "I 
want this case brought to a definitive conclusion." Thus, his comment 
about the case reflects his recognition that it is still pending, for it has not 
yet come to a "definitive conclusion. "29 
4. THE WASHINGTON POST, Reluctant Ruling for Judge; Jackson 
Says He Would Still Prefer Out-of-Court Settlement, June 8, 2000. The 
article reports that the Microsoft judge said, "in an interview with the 
Washington Post yesterday" that "I would have preferred a conduct 
remedy. I've always thought the best remedy was the one the parties 
could have negotiated between themselves." The article includes exten-
sive quotations from the judge about the case and reports that "[i]n an 
hour long conversation in his chambers, the judge said that rather than 
see a breakup imposed, the lawsuit could be settled out of court-even 
now." The judge also disclosed how he expected to rule on a motion that 
had not yet been filed: "Asked if he intended to approve a government 
27. Joel Brinkley & Steve Lohr, Retracing the Missteps of the Microsofi Defense, N.Y. TIMES. 
June 9, 2000, at Al (emphasis added). 
28. John R Wilke, For Antitrust Judge, Trust, or Lack of It, Reafly Was the Issue in an Interview, 
Jackson Says Microsoft Did the Damage to Its Credibifity in Court, WALL ST. J., June 8, 2000, at A3. 
29. Ted Bridis & John It Wilke, Judge Orders Microsoji Broken in Two, Imposes Tough Restric-
tions on Practice, WALL ST. J., June 8, 2000, at A3. 
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motion to send the case quickly to the Supreme Court, bypassing the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, the judge said, 'I am favora-
bly inclined towards it. I'll look at whatever is presented to me.'"30 
5. THE Los ANGELES TIMES, Public Remarks by Judge in Microsoft 
Ruling Stir Furor, June 9, 2000. The article reports that "In an interview 
Thursday [J nne 8] with the Los Angeles Times, a relaxed U.S. District 
Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson said he had no idea whether his com-
ments to the press Wednesday might have a negative effect on a higher 
court consideration of the antitrust case." The judge is reported to ex-
plain why he granted the press interviews- "because of the extraordi-
nary amount of attention given to the case .... I thought it would be use-
ful to give some sense as to who I am and what I have done .... I am not 
the Wizard of Oz in a black robe or some omniscient wise man."31 
6. The Microsoft trial judge also granted two interviews to National 
Public Radio as reported in the following broadcasts: 
a. NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO: All Things Considered; Profile: Judge 
Thomas Penfield Jackson and His Views on His Standing in the Microsoft 
Antitrust Case, June 8, 2000. According to the script, host Linda 
Wertheimer says, "Today in an interview with NPR, Judge Jackson said 
a settlement would not have to include a break-up to satisfy him." The 
script then records Judge Jackson's answers to questions from NPR re-
porter Larry Abramson about the appeal and the possibility of an out-of-
court settlement. Abramson observes that "Judge Jackson has said he 
supports asking the Supreme Court to hear the case directly withont hav-
ing to go to the appeals court." The script also records Judge Jackson as 
acknowledging that the case is still pending: "I'm not sure how much of 
it is behind me. There's a distinct likelihood that it could come back to 
me again, too, in one form or another. But I'm not prepared to take a 
vacation yet. "32 
b. NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO: Morning Edition; Interview: .fudge 
Thomas Penfield Jackson Discusses The Microsoft Case and His Ruling 
Against the Company, June 9, 2000. According to the script, host Bob 
Edwards says, "in an interview with NPR, the judge discussed his reasons 
for ordering the breakup of the world's largest software company and 
why he is confident the ruling will stand up on appeal." The script then 
records the judge's answers to another round of questions from NPR re-
porter Larry Abramson discussing his rulings in the case. Abramson ob-
serves that the trial judge refused Microsoft's request for hearings on the 
breakup proposal because "he [the judge] says he didn't expect to learn 
30. James V. Grimaldi, Reluctant Ruling for Judge; Jackson Says He Would Still Prefer Out~of­
Court Settlement, WASH. POST, June 8, 2000, at Al. 
31. Jube Shiver Jr., Public Remarks by Judge in Microsoft Ruling Stir Furor, LA. TIMES, June 9, 
2000, at Cl. 
32. All Things Considered; Profile: Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson and His Views on His Stand-
ing in the Microsoft Antitrust Case (NPR radio broadcast, June 8, 2000). 
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much from a bunch of experts with conflicting predictions." The judge is 
recorded as saying, "quite frankly I have found over time that even ex-
pert predictions as to the future are not particularly illuminating and very 
often not very accurate." The judge is also recorded as saying. "I always 
have moments of doubt. There are on any number of occasions I made 
rulings in the case which it's entirely possible an appellate court [is J going 
to find were ill-advised. "33 
After these series of interviews were published, and after receiving 
criticism from lawyers and academics for granting these interviews about 
a pending case, in late October, 2000, the Microsoft trial judge engaged 
in extrajudicial comments yet again. He spoke for twenty minutes about 
the Microsoft case and his role in it at an antitrust seminar that George 
Mason University Law School sponsored. He spoke while his rulings 
were pending in the D.C. Circuit.34 In the course of his speech, he con-
ceded that "virtually everything I did may be vulnerable on appeal. "35 
He also said: "If I am found to have been egregiously in error, then even 
if they [the D.C. Circuit) didn't remove me from the case, I might very 
well think very seriously about removing myself."36 In .January 2001, the 
New Yorker published a summary article describing the Microsoft litiga-
tion in part based on still other interviews with Judge Jackson.37 
C. Applying the Federal Ethics Rules 
The extrajudicial statements of the trial judge in the Microsoft case 
do not appear to fit within any of the established exceptions to the no 
comment rule. His interviews were not official duties; they went beyond 
explaining court procedures (e.g., "the next step is for defendants to ap-
peal"); and the comments were not general references to a case as part of 
any law review article and, even if they were, they still were comments 
about a pending case. 
If, as discussed above, a judge violates the public comment restric-
tions when he discusses a case pending in another court, it should be 
33. Morning Edition; Interview: Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson Discusses the Microsoft Case 
and His Ruling Against the Company (NPR radio broadcast, June 9, 2000). 
34. See Jonathan Ringle, Inadmissible, LEGAL TlMES, Oct 30, 2000, at 3. The reporter's com-
ments were a little sarcastic. He titled this section, Making His 75 Minutes Last. The reporter said: 
The appeals court has yet to rule on Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson's handling of the Micro-
soft Cmp. case, but the celebrity jurist certainly knows how to size up an audience. "One thing is 
perfectly clear," Jackson on Friday told about 120 lawyers attending an antitrust seminar at the 
U.S. Capitol sponsored by George Mason Law Review, "I am not preaching to the choir." In-
deed, the audience had just split in a raised-hands vote over whether Jackson's decision to break 
up the software giant was correct (the bulk of Jackson's supporters came from the table of De-
partment of Justice staffers). 
ld. 
35. Trial Judge Comments on Microsoft Ruling, N.Y. TJMES, Oct. 27, 2000, at C14. 
36. James Rowley, Microsoft Judge Could Stand Down from Case, TORONlO STAR, Oct. 28, 
2000 (1st ed.), Business section, at 3. 
37. See Ken Auletta, Final Offer: What Kept Microsoft from Settling Its Case?, NEW YORKER, 
Jan. 15,2001, at40. 
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even more serious if the judge engages in public comment about a case 
that is pending in his court, here, the district court for the District of 
Columbia. And, if that is a violation of the rules, it should be even worse 
if he is discussing a case in which he is the presiding judge-i.e., when the 
case is pending before him personally. That is the situation that applied 
here. 
One does not have to rely on state court interpretations of the 
analogous state ethics rules, for there is federal law on this very question. 
The official Comment to Canon 3A(6) of the Code of Conduct for United 
States Judges explicitly states: 
The admonition against public comment about the merits of a 
pending or impending action continues until completion of the ap-
pellate process. If the public comment involves a case from the 
judge's own court, particular care should be taken that the comment 
does not denigrate public confidence in the integrity and impartial-
ity of the judiciary in violation of Canon 2A.38 
The Microsoft trial judge has argued that his extrajudicial comments 
were permissible because his press interviews were "off the record," and 
by agreement "that they [would] not be published until after the case had 
been decided."39 However, the official Comment to Canon 3A(6) makes 
it clear that a case is pending "until completion of the appellate process." 
Moreover, the judge earlier acknowledged the likelihood that the case 
could be returned to him. In an interview on National Public Radio he 
said: "I'm not sure how much of it is behind me. There's a distinct like-
lihood that it could come back to me again, too, in one form or another. 
But I'm not prepared to take a vacation yet."40 
The reference to Canon 2A, in the Comment to Canon 3A(6) is in-
structive. Canon 2(A) provides: "A judge should respect and comply 
with the law and should act at all times in a manner that promotes public 
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."'' The 
Comment to Canon 3A(6) advises us that a judge who comments about 
the merits of a pending case from the judge's own court runs headlong 
into the requirement that the judge must "respect and comply with the 
law. "42 
Given the specificity of this language of Canon 3A(6) and the ac-
companying Comment, it is no surprise that federal case law comes to the 
same conclusion that the plain language of this rule reaches. In United 
38. 175 F.RD. 364,370-71 (1998) (emphasis added). 
39. Microsoft Judge Says He May Step Down from Case on Appeal, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2000, at 
B4. 
40. All Things Considered; Profile: .fudge Thom.as Penfield Jackson and His Views on His Stand-
ing in the Microsoft Antitrust Case (NPR radio broadcast, June 8, 2000). 
41. 175F.R.D. at365. 
42. !d. 
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States v. Garwood,43 a trial judge gave press and media interviews to na-
tional outlets such as Nightline, and the Associated Press. In those inter-
views, the judge discussed his opinion about the defense's tactical deci-
sions, the relevance of certain discovery items, and his view as to whether 
the defendant should take the stand in a pending case. The reviewing 
court found the judge's conduct "inexcusable" and concluded that the 
judge's comments-even if made with the best intentions-violated the 
ethics rules governing judges.44 
The Microsoft trial judge also sought to defend his extrajudicial 
comments hy arguing that he had a right to make statements to "correct 
some of the public distortions" of the facts by "one or both of the par-
ties."45 The case law clearly rejects this purported defense.'"' If those al-
leged distortions are relevant to the case, he can and should put his ver-
sion of the facts and the law into his opinion, where the parties can 
dispute it and the Court of Appeals can review it based on facts in the re-
cord. In fact, even if his comments are not relevant, he can still write 
what he wants in his opinion, where it becomes part of the record. Then, 
the litigants and the appellate court can respond to it. Or, the judge 
could wait until the case is no longer pending before engaging in any ex-
trajudicial comments.47 
What a judge cannot do is engage in extrajudicial comments about a 
pending case in which he is the trial judge. Please reread this last sen-
tence. It should not be subject to dispute. Accompanying the Code of 
Conduct for United States Judges is a two-volume book that is distributed 
to every federal judge governed by that Code. That book includes vari-
ous ethics opinions intended to give guidance to federal judges. And this 
book categorically states: "It is impermissible for a judge to write an ar-
ticle discussing a particular high-profile case recently completed and still 
on appeal."48 If a judge may not write an article about a particular high-
profile case, it logically follows that it is equally impermissible for a judge 
43. 16 M .. L 863,868 (N.M.C.M.R.1983), aff'd, 20 M.J. 148 (C.M.A. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 
1005 (1985). 
44. Garwood, 16 M.J. at 869. 
45. Microsoft Judge Says He May Step Down from Case on Appeal, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2000, at 
B4 (emphasis added). 
46. E.g., In re Boston's Children First, 239 F.3d 59,66 (1st Cir. 2001) ("Whether counsel for peti-
tioners misrepresented the facts or not is irrelevant the issue here is whether a reasonable person 
could have interpreted [the judge's] comments as doing more than correcting those misrepresentations 
and creating an appearance of partiality."); In re Benoit, 523 A.2d 1381, 1.382-83 (Me. 1987) (unethical 
for a judge, after a case was remanded to him, to write a Iet1er to the editor of a local newspaper de-
fending his original sentences); Shapley v. Tex. Dep't of Human Res., 581 S.W.2d 250, 253 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1979) (judge violated Canon when he spoke to reporters about pending case). 
47. Wenger v. Comm'n on Judicial Performance, 630 P.2d 954,965 (Cal. 1.981); Goldman v. Nev. 
Comm'n on Judicial Discipline, 830 P.2d 107, 136--37 (Nev. 1992). 
48. GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, VOLUME lJ-THE CODE OF CONDUCT 
VOLUME, Ch. V (Compendium of Selected Opinions),§ 4.2 Writing and Editing, at V-57 (reissued on 
June 15, 1999). 
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to say the same words to a reporter who would then include them in his 
or her story. 
IV. THE REMEDY 
In a state system, if a judge violates the no comment rules, judicial 
discipline is often available. State disciplinary authorities might remove 
a judge49 or deprive a judge of a salary for a stated period of time. 50 In 
the federal system, no administrative body has that power, and only 
Congress can remove a judge after impeachment and a trial in the Sen-
ate.51 
The federal appellate court may disqualify the judge if the extraju-
dicial comments indicate that his "impartiality might reasonably be qnes-
tioned."52 That is what happened in United States v. Cooley.53 In that 
case, the convicted defendants were abortion protesters found guilty of 
violating a federallaw.54 The appellate court not only assigned the case 
to a different judge on remand," it also overturned the convictions and 
ordered a new trial because of the trial judge's interview on ABC's 
Nightline, a nationally televised evening program. The very fact that the 
judge had appeared on this show coupled with his other comments, indi-
cated that his "impartiality might reasonably have been questioncd."56 
49. See Butler v. Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, 111 F. Supp. 2d 1241 (M.D. Ala. 2000) (grantii1g 
state supreme court justice's motion to preliminarily enjoin state judicial disciplinary proceedings 
against him). 
50. See In re Sheffield, 465 So. 2d 350, 355 (Ala. 1984) Qudge suspended two months without 
pay). 
51. See Ronald D. Rotunda, An Essay on the Constitutional Parameters of Federal Impeachment, 
76 KY. L.J. 707 (1988); Am. Judicature Soc'y, lmpeaching Federal Judges: Where Are We and Where 
Are We Going?, 72 JUDTCATURE 359 (1989) (comments by Ronald D. Rotunda during panel discus-
sion) (examining federal judicial impeachment process). 
52. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1994). 
53. l F.3d 985 (10th Cir. 1993). 
54. !d. at 987~ .. 88. 18 U.S.C. § 1509 provides: 
Whoever, by threats or force, willfully prevents, obstructs, impedes. or interferes with, or willfully 
attempts to prevent, obstruct, impede, or interfere with, the due exercise of rights or the perform-
ance of duties under any order, judgment, or decree of the United States, shall be fined under this 
title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. 
No injunction or other civil relief against the conduct made criminal by tl1is section shall be 
denied on the ground that such conduct is a crime. 
!d. 
55. !d. at 988. See also In re IBM Corp., 45 F.3d 64J (2d Cir. 1995), where the court directed 
Judge Edelstein "to recuse himself from further consideration of United Stares v. IBM, Civil Action 
No. 72·344 (S.D.N.Y.) and to have the case randomly reassigned." 45 F.3d at 645. The court, in find-
ing the need to order recusal in light of the trial judge's possible lack of impartiality, stated, "Judge 
Edelstein's actions in the aftermath of the stipulation for dismissal extended beyond the courtroom. 
Notable in this regard were newspaper interviews given by the Judge concerning IBM's activities in 
general and Assistant Attorney General Baxter's role in particular." IBM Corp., 45 F.3d at 642 (em-
phasis added). The court used its supervisory powers. 
56. In addition, the "district judge had appeared on national television with Barbara Walters to 
talk about the abortion protests in Wichita, and had stated in part that 'these people are breaking the 
law."' Cooley, 1 F.3d at 990. And, the "district judge had been quoted in national media saying if 
anyone plans to come to Wichita, 'they had better bring a toothbrush!"' !d. The reference to 
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Cooley cited the relevant provisions of the Code of Conduct for 
United States Judges and warned: 
Two messages were conveyed by the judge's appearance on na-
tional television in the midst of these events. One message con-
sisted of the words actually spoken regarding the protesters' appar-
ent plan to bar access to the clinics, and the judge's resolve to see 
his order prohibiting such actions enforced. The other was the 
judge's expressive conduct in deliberately making the choice to ap-
pear in such a forum at a sensitive time to deliver strong views on 
matters which were likely to be ongoing before him. Together, 
these messages unmistakenly conveyed an nncommon interest and 
degree of personal involvement in the subject matter. It was an un-
usual thing for a judge to do, and it unavoidably created the ap-
pearance that the judge had become an active participant in bring-
ing law and order to bear on the protesters, rather than remaining 
as a detached adjndicator.57 
Because of the judge's decision to appear "on national television to 
state his views[,]" a "reasonable person would harbor a justified doubt as 
to his impartiality in the case involving these defendants. "58 
Even if a judge's extrajudicial comments do not impugn his imparti-
ality, the appellate court, in exercise of its supervisory powers, might still 
disqualify the judge. Judges have disqualified prosecutors for giving in-
terviews in violation of court rules, even when there is no finding that the 
remarks could affect a jury. 59 If a court can impose that sanction on a 
prosecutor, who does not have the same responsibilities as a judge to be 
impartial, it should be able to impose a similar sanction on a judge. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In the Microsoft case, the appellate court might use its supervisory 
powers to send the case to a different judge if a remand is appropriate for 
toothbrushes was the judge's way of announcing that the judge would make sure that abortion protes-
tors would have to stay overnight in the jail. 
57. !d. at 995 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Similarly, for example, in February, 2000, 
while the Microsoft trial was going on, the judge said, when the reporter asked him about a breakup of 
the company: "I am not sure I am competent to do that. ... I just don't think that is something 1 want 
to try to do on my own. I wouldn't know how to do it." Joel Brinkley & Steve Lohr, U.S v. Microsoft: 
Pursuing a Giant; Retracing the Mi~steps of the Microsoft Defense, N.Y. TrMES, June 9, 2000, at Al. 
On the final day of trial, the judge rejected Microsoft's bid for a bearing on the government's remedy 
proposal, and the next day told the reporter: "I am not aware of any case authority that says J have to 
give t11em any due process at all. The case is over. They lost." !d. The judge explained to another 
reporter that he did not allow Microsoft to argue against the proposed sanction, because, the judge 
asked rhetorically: "Were the Japanese allowed to propose the terms of their surrender? The gov-
ernment won the case." Wilke, supra note 28. The article reports that when the judge was asked, in 
an interview, about comments to the press and fairness to the parties, "a relaxed" judge said "he had 
no idea whether his comments to the press Wednesday might have a negative effect on a higher court 
consideration of the antitrust case." Shiver Jr., supra note 31 (emphasis added). 
58. Cooley, 1 F.3d at 995. 
59. Prosecutor Disqualified in Oklahoma Bomber's Case, WASH. PosT, Oct. 17, 2000, at A34. 
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other reasons. (Microsoft, after all, has raised other procedural and sub-
stantive points.60) Even if a reversal is not appropriate for other reasons, 
the court may decide, either independently or as an alternative holding, 
to reverse the case based on the trial judge's extrajudicial remarks and 
then remand to a different judge for a new triaL Reversal solely for an 
ethical violation is not a typical remedy, because it appears to penalize 
the party that would otherwise have prevailed were it not for the judge's 
conduct. On the other hand, judges are routinely reversed for error that 
is not the fault of either party, just as when a judge who makes prejudi-
cial comments to the _jury. Reversal serves to discourage judges from en-
gaging in such conduct in the future. We must remember in this instance 
that the judge continued to engage in extrajudicial comments, even after 
commentators openly questioned his series of interviews61 
There is another salient fact that should be added to this eq nation. 
The remedy of reversal should be more likely in the situation where an 
appellate court has already warned the judge not to engage in snch extra-
judicial comments. Unfortunately, that is the situation here-the D.C. 
Circuit, in an earlier case, admonished this same judge for his extrajudi-
cial statements about a case in which he was the trial judge.62 In that 
case, however, the court refused to reverse and remand for a new trial 
before a different jndge.63 
Although the Microsoft judge has also said (in yet another discus-
sion about this pending case) he would likely recuse himself even if the 
D.C. Circuit did not require the case to be assigned to another judge,64 
the trial judge's belated65 willingness to disqualify himself-even if it is 
legally enforceable-does not make removal by the court of appeals a 
moot point, for an appellate court's adjudication that such conduct is a 
violation of the rules would serve to curb such extrajudicial statements in 
future cases. 
60. Commentators have also raised important procedural and substantive issues that make a re-
versal likely. See Robert A. Levy & Alan Reynolds, Microsoft's Appealing Case, CATO INSTITUTE 
POLICY ANALYSIS, No. 385 (Nov. 9, 2000), at http://www.cato.org//pubs/pas/pa-385es.html. 
61. Eg., Davidson, supra note 21 (citing Professor Steven Lubet of Northwestern University 
Law School); Grimaldi, supra note 21 (quoting, e.g., Professor Steven Gillers o( New York University 
Law School); Orland, supra note 21 (Professor Orland of the University of Connecticut Law School). 
62. See In re Barry, 946 F.2d 913,914 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
63. See id. at 914. 
64. E.g., Rowley, supra note 36. 
65. Earlier, in an interview on National Public Radio, the judge said: "I'm not sure how much of 
it is behind me. There's a distinct likelihood that it could come back to me again, too, in one form or 
another. But I'm not prepared to take a vacation yet." All Things Considered; Profile: Judge Thomas 
Penfield Jackson and His Views on His Standing in the Microsoft Antitrust Case (NPR radio broadcast, 
June 8, 2000) (emphasis added). 
